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MAKING THE CASE FOR CREDIT DEFAULT
SWAPS: BALANCING LIQUIDITY CONCERNS
WITH POSITION LIMITS UNDER DODD-FRANK
BY ANDREW CALI-VASQUEZ*
INTRODUCTION
Derivatives have long been criticized as being volatile and hazardous
financial instruments,' but the recent financial crisis triggered a level of
public scrutiny and animosity towards derivatives that was heretofore
unseen.2 Mainstream media leapt at the opportunity to find a target for the
public's anger and frustration: banks and hedge funds, armed with balance
sheets full of arcane financial instruments.3 Politicians found a new cause
with which to galvanize their constituents. 4 Dodd-Frank was born.5
Dodd-Frank, or "The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
* J.D., cum laude, June 2012, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Asian and Middle Eastern
Studies, May 2005, University of Pennsylvania.
I See ALICE SCHROEDER, THE SNOWBALL: WARREN BUFFETT AND THE BUSINESS OF LIFE 603
(Trade Paperback ed. 2009) (quoting Buffett regarding his opinion on derivatives, which included
calling them, "toxic," "time bombs," and "financial weapons of mass destruction"); James B. Kelleher,
Buffet's "Time Bomb" Goes Off on Wall Street, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-derivatives-credit-idUSN1837154020080918
(summarizing the link between the beginning of the financial crisis and derivatives).
2 See Kelleher, supra note 1; Gretchen Morgenson, It's Time for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, at BUI (stating that the current financial crisis and ones in the future would
be "derivatives-fueled").
3 See Editorial, Investors Beware, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at A22 (stating that derivatives are
"the complex instruments that were at the heart of the financial crisis"); Lee Vance, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A18 (referencing the demonization of hedge funds as a result of the
mortgage collapse); Wall St. Booster, in Primary Bid, Shifts From Shouts to Murmurs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2010, at Al (noting that a Congressional candidate "described the demonizing of financial
executives").
4 Congress began the drafting process in 2009, following the Lehman Brothers and Bear Steams
collapses, as well as the passage of TARP. See John L. Ropiequet et al., An Introduction to the Dodd-
Frank Act - The New Regulatory Structure for Consumer Finance Emerges, 29 No. 8 BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 1 (2010). Bailouts were meant only to be a short-term fix however, whereas
Dodd-Frank was intended to implement "sweeping financial regulatory reform." Id.; Damian Paletta &
Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes US. Financial Landscape, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704682604575369030061839958.html.
5 Dodd-Frank was signed into law on July 21, 2010 by President Barack Obama. See Ropiequet et
al., supra note 4, at 1.
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Protection Act," is a gargantuan statute, reminiscent of the legislation
enacted following the Great Depression. 6 Underlying the details of what
the Act actually does, are goals of regulatory empowerment, and an
emphasis on the protection of consumers and individual investors.7 Title
VII of Dodd-Frank focuses on the regulation of over-the-counter ("OTC")
derivatives.8 Included in this title is a mandate of authority to the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC"); this mandate gives each agency the authority to
impose limits on the positions that "any person" may hold in these
derivatives.9 The reasoning behind this is fairly easy to discern: If a limit is
placed on the size of the position that banks may amass, then damage from
fallout would be limited.
This Note focuses on the imposition of position limits on the credit
default swapo ("CDS") market, and posits that the grant of authority to the
SEC and CFTC under Title VII of Dodd-Frank, which gives each agency
the authority to impose position limits on certain OTC derivatives, if
applied too harshly, would have a harmful effect on the U.S. lending
economy, and consequently on smaller businesses that require regular
financing to fund their operations." Lenders use CDSs to protect
6 See id.
7 See U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1-2,
http://banking.senate.gov/public/ files/070110 DoddFrankWallStreetReform comprehensivesu
mmaryFinal.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
8 See generally, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8301
(2012). See also DAVIS POLK, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010 52-53 (2010),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-
b7cG25ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ld4495c7-ObeO-4e9a-ba77-
f786fb90464a/070910_FinancialReform Summary.pdf (last visited Apr.12, 2012).
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 8301, §§ 737, 763.
10 ISDA defines "credit default swap" as follows:
A credit default swap is a credit derivative contract in which one party (protection buyer) pays an
[sic] periodic fee to another party (protection seller) in return for compensation for default (or
similar credit event) by a reference entity. The reference entity is not a party to the credit default
swap. It is not necessary for the protection buyer to suffer an actual loss to be eligible for
compensation if a credit event occurs.
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Product
Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions].
II See MICHAEL J. CHOW ET AL., NFIB RESEARCH FOUNDATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVING SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT ACCESS AND FINANCIAL REFORM 2 (2009),
http://www.nfib.com/Portals/O/Recommendations-for-Improving-Small-
Business Credit Access and FinancialReform.pdf ("Bank credit plays an important role in small
business success. Without access to bank
lending, small business owners would have trouble raising the funds they need to operate and grow their
businesses."); WILLIAM J. DENNIS, JR., NFIB RESEARCH FOUNDATION, SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT IN A
DEEP RECESSION 7 (2010), http:// www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/studies/Small-
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themselves against loss in the case of default, changes in a borrower's
creditworthiness, and other "credit events." 12 The existence and widespread
availability of such protection encourage lenders to extend credit to
businesses.13 This Note suggests that too severely limiting the access of
lenders to these instruments would undermine the way they currently
transact business and could ultimately injure borrowers as a result of their
inability to obtain affordable financing, or any financing at all.
Section I of this Note provides background information about the
structure, use and history of CDSs, particularly in the context of lending
transactions; Section II analyzes the relationship between CDSs and
commercial lending; Section III discusses the pre-Dodd-Frank regulatory
landscape, examines of the historic applications of position limits and
related issues, reviews a recently proposed position limit scheme for
physical commodities, and proposes a framework for CDS position limits
that balances liquidity concerns with the need for increased regulation; and
the final section concludes that the implementation of the proposed position
limit scheme would provide sufficient protection for the financial markets,
while maintaining sufficient liquidity in the CDS markets, for the benefit of
lenders and borrowers alike.
The following section provides the reader with a basic understanding of
CDSs, including their components and operation, as well as their
application in relation to certain financial transactions. This background
material should provide a context in which to understand the importance of
CDSs to the issuance of debt, and, thus, the need for a position limit
framework that properly addresses and balances concerns over lending
liquidity with those of ensuring market integrity.
I. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
Credit derivatives (which include CDSs) were created for use in
mitigating credit risk associated with a party fulfilling a financial
Business-Credit-In-a-Deep-Recession-February-2010-NFIB.pdf (summarizing research showing that
significantly more business owners were unable to meet their credit needs in 2009 when compared with
the mid-2000s).
12 See MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIvES 62 (2d ed. 2006). According to ISDA, there
are six officially recognized types of credit events, which include "bankruptcy, failure to pay,
restructuring, obligation acceleration, obligation default and repudiation/moratorium." See International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Derivatives Consulting Group Glossary,
http://www.isda.org/c and a/opercommit-dcg-glossary.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) [hereinafter
Derivatives Consulting Group Glossary].
13 See DURBIN, supra note 12, at 63; Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?,
TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,85 9 9,1723152,00.html.
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obligation. 14 One useful way of thinking about a credit derivative is as a
"performance guarantee," such that through a contractual agreement, the
performance of a party is guaranteed.15 In a situation where a lender
extends financing, either through a loan or the purchase of bonds, there is
risk based on the ability of the borrower to repay the debt; this risk is
known as credit risk.16 One of the chief advantages of credit derivatives is
that they allow lenders to divide the overall lending risk into its two main
components, interest rate risk and credit risk.17 Separating the components
of the risk involved in a lending transaction make it easier for the lender to
protect itself against loss, and in turn will make the lender more likely to
lend.18 This Note focuses on the CDS, which is the most widely used credit
derivative. 19 Many credit derivatives are fundamentally similar in that they
involve payments by the protection buyer in exchange for said protection,
however they can also vary widely with respect to the nature of the
protection provided or the terms of default. 20
The CDS involves two parties: the protection buyer and the protection
seller.21 The buyer pays the seller a premium, which is also known as the
"credit spread"; that premium usually takes the form of an annual payment,
which is calculated as a percentage of the swap's notional. 22 In exchange
for these fixed payments which take place over the life of the swap, the
protection seller can become obligated to make a large single payment in
the event that a credit event occurs. 23 Once the event occurs, and the
protection seller has made the payment to the protection buyer, the swap
14 See DURBIN, supra note 12, at 61. ISDA defines credit derivatives as "privately negotiated
agreement[s] that explicitly shifts credit risk from one party to the other." Product Descriptions and
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.
15 See DURBIN, supra note 12, at 62; Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 10 (identifying a credit derivative as a private contract).
16 See DURBIN, supra note 12, at 62.
17 See id.
18 See id at 62-63.
19 See Derivatives Consulting Group Glossary, supra note 12; Julio Arboleda-Florez & Joel
Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, 9.1 (2011), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=oq-
MAjw2ezQC&pg-PT200&lpg-PT200&dq=cds+most+widely+used+credit+derivative&source=bl&ots
=CneCytr-
v5&sig-P262gussNBFOtS21tfB4YY3ev4w&hl=en&sa=X&ei-yZKMT6yjG8b4OgHxrbjxCQ&ved=OC
DkQ6AEwAzgK#v-=onepage&q=cds%20most/o20widely/o20used%20credit%20derivative&f-false.
20 See DURBIN, supra note 12, at 63-68; Distressed Investing: Selected Topics, American
Bankruptcy Institute, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. CLE, Oct. 5, 2007,071005 ABI-CLE 5.
21 See DURBIN, supra note 12, at 64.
22 See id. at 63-65. "For credit default swaps, notional amount refers to the par amount of credit
protection bought or sold, equivalent to debt or bond amounts, and is used to derive the premium
payment calculations for each payment period and the recovery amounts in the event of a default."
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., CDS Marketplace,
http://www.isdacdsmarketplace.com/market-statistics/understandingnotional-amount.
23 See DURBIN, supra note 12, at 64.
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terminates. 24 This process is best illustrated through an example.
Suppose that X (a company building a portfolio of investments to make
use of its excess capital) purchases $10 million dollars worth of bonds
issued by Y (a small operating company which sought to raise capital to
help finance its business through a debt issuance). 25 Although Y appears to
be a financially sound company, X wishes to maintain and protect the value
of its investment, so it contacts Z (an investment bank) to execute a CDS.
The notional of the swap is $10 million dollars, which is the face value of
the bonds issued by Corporation Y, and the tenor of the swap will match
the maturity period of the bonds (so if the bonds have a maturity of ten
years, the swap will be structured to cover that same period of time). We
are left with the following transaction: X faces Z in a CDS, in which X is
the protection buyer and Z is the protection seller; the swap references the
bonds issued by Y, who is the reference entity (and not a party to the
swap). Z will charge X an annual premium which will be a percentage of
the $10 million dollar notional, in exchange for the credit protection
afforded by the swap.
Now suppose that Y starts to find itself in financial distress and
eventually files for bankruptcy. The filing (and possibly the occurrence of
financial distress, depending on the extent and terms defined by the parties
to the swap) will be a credit event. Assume that as a result of the
bankruptcy filing taking place, the bonds are now worth $2 million dollars,
which means X has incurred a loss in its investment of $8 million dollars. 26
The parties, X and Z, now have two options, depending on the way the
swap was structured; they can either cash-settle or physically settle. 27 If the
parties cash-settle, Z will make a cash payment to X for the amount of the
loss stemming from the event, namely $8 million dollars, after which the
swap will terminate and the parties will owe each other no further
obligation. 28 If the parties physically settle, there will be an exchange once
the event occurs; X will physically deliver the bonds issued by Y, which
underlie the swap, and in exchange for those bonds, Z will pay X the
notional amount of the swap, meaning $10 million dollars (which is also
the original face value of the bonds).29 That exchange would conclude the
24 See ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 174 (3d ed. 2003).
25 See DuRBIN, supra note 12, at 65. The value of the bond portfolio is adapted from an example
provided here.
26 See id. The amount of the devaluation of the bond portfolio is adapted from an example provided
on this page.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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obligations between the parties and the swap would be terminated. 30
This example, in a nutshell, describes a typical CDS transaction. The
reader should note that the reference obligation, meaning the bonds issued
by Y in the example above, is not limited to bonds. 31 Some other typical
underlying assets could be unsecured loans, asset-backed securities, or
syndicated secured loans. 32 Thus, if we substitute $10 million dollars in
bonds, with a $10 million dollar unsecured loan from X to Y in the above
example, the same outcome would result once the credit event occurred: X
could physically deliver the loan to Z and receive the full $10 million, or
simply receive a single, cash payment for the decrease in value of the loan.
The example above is seemingly mundane, but demonstrates the
usefulness of the transaction for each of the parties involved. X buys
protection for the financing which it extended to Y; Z receives an annual
principal payment, which continues as long as no credit event occurs; and
Y, at least arguably, is more likely to obtain financing at a reasonable rate
because potential lenders know they will be able to purchase protection
against Y's default. The reader can see that through the use of the swap, the
lender can obtain something akin to an insurance policy to protect its loan
(or bond portfolio), and thus is incentivized to lend at a more affordable
interest rate, which in turn allows increased borrowing, which is obviously
useful and essential to most businesses.
Having addressed the fundamentals of credit derivatives and CDSs, the
following section of this Note examines the relationship between CDSs
(specifically CDS liquidity) and the lending markets, particularly with
respect to the availability of financing. The need to preserve liquidity and
thereby ensure the availability of financing underlies the need for a position
limit framework discussed in Section III.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CDS AND LENDING
MARKETS
What effect does CDS liquidity 33 actually have on bank lending? 34 Frank
30 See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 24, at 174.
31 See Derivatives Consulting Group Glossary, supra note 12. A "reference obligation" is defined
as "[a] bond, loan or other payment obligation, issued by the reference entity." Id. The "reference
entity" is defined as "[t]he underlying company or Sovereign which issues the debt obligation or
obligations which constitute the reference obligation(s) under a credit derivative." Id.
32 See id The definition of "Loan-Only Credit Default Swap," which is a type of CDS in which the
reference obligation is a "syndicated secured loan." Id. That definition contrasts the loan-only reference
obligation to those used in other CDSs, which can include a "bond, unsecured loan or asset backed
security." Id.
33 See Francis Cianfrocca, Coffee & Markets, How Much Credit Should We Have in the World?
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Partnoy and David Skeel "discuss the benefits associated with ... credit
derivatives, which include ... increased liquidity [and] reduced transaction
costs." 35 They find that "[b]ecause credit default swaps enable banks to
lend at lower risk, these contracts increase liquidity in the banking
industry."36 Furthermore, "[b]ecause [credit default] swaps limit the bank's
downside risk ... banks are willing to lend much more money to many
more businesses. Credit default swaps thus significantly expand
companies' access to capital from bank lending." 37
The recent Greek financial crisis provides an example of the relation
between CDSs and the debt markets. The crisis has been linked by some
commentators to the unscrupulous use of CDSs by hedge funds; 38 however,
empirical findings have indicated otherwise. In late 2010, Fitch Ratings
released the results of a study done on the relationship between sovereign
debt and CDS liquidity.39 This study examined approximately two and a
half years of data and reached the conclusion that "[w]here . . . CDS
liquidity is high, bond yieldS40 tend to fall, thus reducing the cost of
funding .... Conversely, bond yields increase when liquidity in the CDS
market falls off."41 Of particular import to this Note, was the finding that
"any market intervention which might reduce CDS liquidity [such as
(Mar. 9, 2010), http://newledger.com/2010/03/how-much-credit-should-we-have-in-the-world/
("Liquidity means you can buy or sell an instrument, in size, on short notice, without significantly
moving the market."); see also EsME FARBER, ALL ABOUT BONDs AND BOND MUTUAL FUNDs 37 (2d
ed. 2000) ("Liquidity is defined as the ability to convert an investment into cash without losing a
significant amount of the funds invested.").
34 While this section of the Note seeks to provide a series of analyses to demonstrate the existence
of a relationship between CDS liquidity, bank lending, and the economic health of small businesses,
there appear to have been no empirical studies done which link CDS liquidity specifically with small
business lending. Further study in this area, as part of this proposed position limit scheme, would help
mitigate any possible future harm to small businesses.
35 Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., Nineteenth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: Debt as a
Lever of Control: The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1019,1022 (2007).
36 Id. at 1024.
37 Id. at 1025.
38 See Cianfrocca, supra note 33. See also David Francis, The Fiscal Times, How Hedge Funds Are
Exploiting the Euro Crisis (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/12/15/How-
Hedge-Funds-Are-Exploiting-the-Euro-Crisis (noting that "[a]s long as banks are willing to offer
[CDSs] on European debt - meaning they believe that this crisis will be solved - hedge funds can drive
up the price of bonds, making it harder and harder for Greece to pay its debt.").
39 See Business Wire, BNET, Fitch Solutions: Higher CDS Liquidity Benefits Sovereign Funding
Costs (Oct. 19, 2010), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOEIN/is_20101019/ain55823612/.
40 See Bond Prices, Rates and Yields, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/fixed-income-
bonds/bond-prices-rates-yields (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (explaining that a "bond's yield . .. [is] the
expected return on the bond" and is "expressed as an annual percentage"); see also Advanced Bond
Concepts: Yield and Bond Price,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/advancedbondladvancedbond3.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2011)
("The general definition of yield is the return an investor will receive by holding a bond to maturity.").
41 See Business Wire, supra note 39.
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severely restrictive position limits] during periods of market stress would in
fact exacerbate . . . funding issues." 4 2
Alessio Saretto and Heather Tookes recently addressed the issue of
whether "the ability of suppliers of debt to hedge risk through credit default
swap (CDS) contracts impact firms' capital structures." 43 They conclude
that firms that have debt referenced by CDSs are able to borrow more
proportionate to their liquid assets and are able to borrow with repayment
terms over longer periods of time than those firms whose debt was not
referenced by CDSs.44 Generally speaking, during periods where
borrowing is difficult, the firms whose debt underlies CDSs have greater
access to capital than those firms whose debt is not hedged through CDS
positions.45 Saretto and Tookes find two main reasons why widespread
availability of CDSs increase ease with which businesses can borrow. 46
First, while treasury bondS47 are generally considered to be a more
conservative investment than corporate bonds, a liquid CDS market widens
the appeal of investing in corporate bonds because through the execution of
CDSs, the risk for the purchaser is reduced.48 When small or new
businesses opt to issue publically traded debt, their debt is often given a
low grade by ratings agencies because of either a poor or virtually non-
existent repayment history. 49 The benefits of this type of financing,
particularly in the case of "smaller or younger companies" cannot be
overstated, as borrowing through bond issuance generally has "fewer
restrictive covenants than bank financings."50 That in turn gives the
company greater operational freedom, which again is particularly beneficial
to early-stage and small companies.51 Also, the fact that the offering is
42 See id.
43 ALESSIO SARETrO & HEATHER TOOKES, CORPORATE LEVERAGE, DEBT MATURITY AND CREDIT
DEFAULT SWAPS: THE ROLE OF CREDIT SUPPLY 1 (2010),
http://w4.stem.nyu.edu/salomon/docs/conferences/Yale-Tookes%20-%20CDS%20&%20Leverage.pdf.
44 See SARETTO & TOOKES, supra note 43, at 1.
45 See id
46 See id, at 1-2.
47 This term is used to denote all maturities of U.S. government-issued debt, as opposed to just
long-dated issues.
48 See SARET7O & TOOKES, supra note 43, at 2.
49 See JANE TRIPP HOWE, JUNK BONDS: ANALYSIS & PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES 13 (1988). See also
Rose Johnson, The Advantages of Corporate Sinking Funds, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-corporate-sinking-funds-34244.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2013) (explaining that "[s]mall businesses with poor credit ratings typically must pay investors greater
interest rates on bonds to compensate for the risk investors take when investing in the company").
50 Id.
51 See id; see also Nash et al., Determinants of Contractual Relations Between Shareholders and
Bondholders: Investment Opportunities and Restrictive Covenants, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 201, 205 (2001),
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.394&rep-repl&type=pdf
(observing that "when firms refinance bank debt with junk bonds, the junk bonds are less restrictive
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made publically (i.e., traded on an exchange) means "greater public
awareness of the issuing company and its products." 52 Thus, because
liquidity in the CDS markets increases the appeal of investing in corporate
debt through a reduction of credit risk, companies, particularly young
and/or small companies whose debt would otherwise be rated as low-grade,
are presumably able to borrow more easily through bond offerings for
which the market will have a greater appetite. Simply stated, CDSs make
these offerings less risky which increases the likelihood of success by the
issuer.
Second, the use of single-name CDSs (i.e., those that reference the debt
of a single borrower) reduces regulatory capital requirements, which in turn
"increas[es] the[] willingness [of banks and insurance companies] to supply
debt capital to firms." 53 In the U.S., depository institutions are required to
keep capital on hand, the amount of which is determined based on the
credit risk of the balance sheet asset (i.e., the loan to the company). 54 By
using CDSs, a lender reduces the credit risk of its balance sheet assets (by
transferring that risk to the counterparty in the swap), which requires it to
keep less capital on hand, thereby allowing it to make more loans. In
aggregate, the increased ability to lend means that companies, particularly
smaller ones that might otherwise be perceived as too risky an investment
for the lender, may have increased access to capital, due to lenders having a
liquid CDS market in which they can trade a borrower's credit risk.
Saretto and Tookes find that "the introduction of CDS markets increases
leverage and extends debt maturity," 55 meaning that companies are able to
borrow more for every dollar that they have and are able to borrow over
longer periods of time. The benefits are as follows: Greater leverage means
than the bank debt. . . . [and] that firms with the need for additional flexibility benefit the most from
reducing the restrictions in their debt.").
52 HOWE, supra note 49, at 13.
53 See SARETFO & TOOKES, supra note 43, at 2.
54 See Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle, Bank Capital Requirements for Market Risk: The
Internal Models Approach, FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW, 2 (Dec. 1997),
http://app.ny.frb.org/research/epr/97v03n4/9712hend.pdf ("[Capital requirements are] minimum
amounts of capital to be held against various categories of on- and off- balance sheet positions....
[including] debt and equity instruments . . . ." "[These requirements are implemented to offset] the risk
of loss from adverse movements in the market values of assets, liabilities, or off-balance sheet
positions."); see also Capital Requirement, INVOSTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalrequirement.asp#axzzlisYMFj8l (last visited Oct. 18,
2013) ("The standardized requirements in place for banks and other depository institutions, which
determines how much liquidity is required to be held for a certain level of assets through regulatory
agencies .... These requirements are put into place to ensure that these institutions are not participating
or holding investments that increase the risk of default and that they have enough capital to sustain
operating losses while still honoring withdrawals.").
55 See SARETrO & TooKEs, supra note 43, at 2-3.
2013] 891
892 JOURNAL OF CIVL RIGHTS & ECONOMTCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:4
more operating income and a longer repayment period means smaller
incremental payments, which increases the likelihood that those payments
will be made on time, meaning less likelihood of default.
Also, Saretto and Tookes find that CDS liquidity has the greatest impact
"in the years in which credit supply constraints are most binding," which
"suggests CDS contracts are an important tool that investors can use to
relax credit constraints and provide investment financing to firms during
downtums." 56 Generally speaking, debt markets tend to be illiquid,
particularly in times of economic stress. 57 CDSs counteract this illiquidity
because parties can readily trade the credit risk of a debt instrument,
"which is a major component of [its] value." 58 As a result, active trading of
CDSs makes debt more liquid, because lenders and investors are reassured
that even locked into something traditionally thought of as illiquid, such as
a loan, the lender can execute a CDS which passes the credit risk of that
loan to another party.59 The transaction benefits the risk averse lender who
is able to reduce the risk of default; it benefits the borrower because lenders
are more apt to extend credit; and it benefits the investor who has an
appetite for risk, because he has a view of the value of this particular credit
risk and believes that his position of incurring this risk will be profitable.
Simply stated, if the liquidity of the CDS markets is "severely restrict[ed]"
through the imposition of position limits, "the whole world will pay a lot
more for capital." 60
Based on the foregoing, the relation between and the importance of
CDSs to the availability of financing should be clear, as should the risk of
impairing CDS liquidity through the overly aggressive imposition of
position limits. The following section discusses the historic regulation of
CDSs and use of position limits, analyzes recently proposed position limit
framework for commodity derivatives, and sets forth a proposal for the
imposition of position limits on CDSs.
56 Id. at 3.
57 See Felix Salmon, Greece Reaps the Benefit of its CDS Market (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/03/04/greece-reaps-the-benefit-of-its-cds-market/ ("One of
the big problems with debt markets is that, especially during times of stress, they become very
illiquid."). See also Cianfrocca, supra note 33. ("The credit-default swap is an instrument that
overcomes the illiquidity of fixed-income assets.").
58 Cianfrocca, supra note 33.
59 See id.
60 Id.
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III. REGULATION
Until recently, there was very little regulation in place that impacted
CDSs.61 This might seem surprising given the magnitude of the global
CDS market; 62 however, prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, "federal
regulation of CDSs [had] been limited to the Securities and Exchange
Commission's.. . jurisdiction over CDSs for fraud, market manipulation,
and insider trading." 63 Additionally, federal banking regulations had some
input because of the large number of commercial banks which also
participated in CDS trading.64
"Title VII of the Act sets forth the new legislative framework for
derivatives," 65 with particular attention paid to the regulatory treatment of
OTC derivatives. Jurisdiction over OTC derivatives is divided into two
broad categories: "swaps" and "security-based swaps." "Swaps" are
regulated by the CFTC; "security-based swaps" are regulated by the SEC.66
Despite the jurisdictional schism, Dodd-Frank attempts to "establish
parallel rules for swaps and security-based swaps," 67 and does so through
amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.68
61 See Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation and its Limits: The Evolution of the Credit
Default Swaps Market, 54 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 689, 690 (2010) (stating that historically, OTC
derivatives were subject to minimal federal regulation).
62 According to the Bank of International Settlements, as of June 2010 the size of the CDS market
globally was $30 trillion U.S. dollars in notional amount outstanding. See Bank for International
Settlements, Table 19: Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives,
http://www.bis.org/statistics/oteder/dtl920a.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). Note that that amount
includes both single-issue/narrow-index and multi-name/index CDSs, which are given different
treatment under Dodd-Frank, including which federal agency is responsible for regulating them. See
Sidley Austin LLP, Dodd-Frank Essentials for End-Users of OTC Derivatives - Update 1: What is a
"Swap "? 3 (2010), http://www.sidley.com/files/News/065b7999-8bf3-4 1 f5-9 1b2-
692822203a0e/Presentation/NewsAttachment/Oa3bee42-46aa-4b71-8216-
a5156a5c4854/investment/o2Ofunds%20update%2081710.pdf. This disparate treatment is discussed in
greater detail later in this section.
63 Shadab, supra note 61, at 692.
6 See id. See also Adam Reiser, An Economic Analysis and Legal Framework for Credit Default
Swap Regulation, 4 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE 101, 106 n.29 (2009), available at
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/journals/ncbank/balancesheet/aneconomicanalysisandlegalframewo
rkforcreditdefaultswapregulation.pdf (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that "the
Federal Reserve Bank and the Office of the Comptroller have helped fill the CDS regulatory void" left
by the Commodities Exchange Act).
65 Covington & Burling LLP, New Rules for Derivatives 1 (2010),
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/fllbd6db-d8f2-46dl-b9lb-
da0b30a44157/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/88322576-8el2-48ab-8c61-daca964bb4e0/Dodd-
Frank%20Act%20-%2ONew/2ORules%20for /20Derivatives.pdf.
66 § 737, 124 Stat. at 1722; § 763, 124 Stat. at 1778; Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 65, at 1.
67 Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 65, at 2.
68 § 737, 124 Stat. at 1722; § 763, 124 Stat. at 1778; Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 65, at 2
n.1.
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Within Title VII, and the focus of this Note, is the mandate issued to the
CFTC and SEC to establish position limits for certain OTC derivatives,
which includes CDSs.69 Under Title VII, the SEC and CFTC now have the
"authority to issue rules (or direct any self-regulatory organization to issue
rules) limiting the size of positions in [CDSs] that may be held by any
particular person or entity." 70 For CDSs, the method used to calculate these
limits is still undecided, and so CDS users await the determinations made
by the SEC and CFTC.71
Adding to the uncertainty is the question of which agency will be
responsible for the regulation of CDSs.72 The two terms, "swap" and
"security-based swap," each include CDSs within their scope. 73 Thus, the
SEC and CFTC will both have jurisdiction over CDSs.74 The distinction
which determines the extent of that jurisdiction is the reference obligation
underlying the CDS.75 In the case of single-name CDSs, or CDSs
referencing a narrow-based index of securities, the SEC will have
jurisdiction; in the case of CDSs referencing broad-based security indices,
or multiple loans or an index of loans, the CFTC will have jurisdiction.76
Regardless of the jurisdictional curiosities, the important takeaway is that
position limits can and will be imposed on CDSs in the near future.77
A. Position Limits Historically
Generally defined, position limits provide a cap on the number of a
69 § 210, 124 Stat. at 1486; § 761, 124 Stat. at 1756; see Sidley Austin LLP, supra note 62, at 3
(noting that some of the products covered by Title VII will be subject to mandatory clearing
requirements).
70 Eric J. Peterman et al., Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, The Dodd-Frank Act and Credit
Derivatives: A Market Transformed 5 (2010), http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/322a598a-722d-
4d09-872c-b6456dac5828/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8afdlbdf-69dl-403d-8113-
c241ele002f5/the%20dodd%20frank%20acto20and%20credit%20der.pdf
71 Eric J. Peterman et al., supra note 70, at 5; see Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 65, at 2
(discussing that the CFTC and SEC will have to clarify issues regarding CDSs).
72 See Sidley Austin LLP, supra note 62, at 3 ("[fIt remains to be seen how the SEC will choose to
regulate these products going forward."); see also Eric J. Peterman et al., supra note 70, at 7 ("The
economics that will drive the CDS market in the coming years will be affected directly by the manner in
which the SEC and CFTC undertake their respective roles in promulgating new rules under the Act.").
73 § 737, 124 Stat. at 1722; § 763, 124 Stat. at 1778; see Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 65,
at 2 (noting that the definition of security-based swaps "leaves some doubt as to the classification of
credit default swaps").
74 Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 65, at 2.
75 Id. at 8.
76 § 737, 124 Stat. at 1722; § 763, 124 Stat. at 1778; Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 65, at 2.
77 The SEC and CFTC do have the authority to exempt any class of derivatives from the position
limits; however, it seems unlikely, despite the arguments expressed in this Note, that they will do so in
the case of CDSs. See § 737, 124 Stat. at 1724; § 763, 124 Stat. at 1778.
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particular type contract that a person is allowed to hold or control. 78 The
historical purpose of position limits is to prevent "excessive speculation
causing sudden or unwarranted volatility in commodity prices" and "to
detect and deter potential price manipulation." 79 Initially, limits were
imposed on contracts (i.e., futures and options) that were subject to
physical delivery, especially during the "spot month," meaning "the month
when the futures contract matures and becomes deliverable."80 The CFTC
points out that "[s]tricter limits in the spot month are important because
that is when physical delivery may be required and ... [the commodity]
may be more vulnerable to price fluctuation caused by abnormally large
positions or disorderly trading practices." 81 Additionally, position limits
may be imposed on financial futures and options that have the potential for
vulnerability to excessive speculation.82 Presumably what makes a
physically deliverable commodity so vulnerable to speculation is that its
supply is finite at any given time, making it easier for a would-be
78 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 150.2 (establishing position limits for certain agricultural contracts).
79 PAUL QUENEAU, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF POSITION LIMITS IN THE ENERGY MARKETS 1
(2010),
http://www.rkco.com/Corporate/Admin/AttachmentFiles/wall-street-argus/RK WallStreetArgus 4 10
pos%201imitsf.pdf.; Fred Seamon, Speculative Position Limits and Hedge Exemptions, CME GROUP, 5(2008),
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/agricultural/files/Spec LimitsandHedge FundExemptions_0707
08.pdf;
80 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, Speculative Limits,
http://www.cftc.gov/lndustryOversight/MarketSurveillance/SpeculativeLimits/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2012). See Chris McMahon, Financial Settlement vs. Physical Delivery (Jul. 25, 2006),
http://www.futuresmag.com/Issues/2006/8/Pages/Financial-settlement-vs-physical-delivery.aspx
(explaining that the right of physical delivery with respect to a futures contract "[is] a legally binding
agreement to take, or to make, delivery of a pre-specified quantity and quality of a commodity on a
predetermined date at a predetermined location."); Physical Delivery, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/physicaldelivery.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (stating that
"Physical Delivery" is a "[t]erm in an options or futures contract which requires the actual underlying
asset to be delivered upon the specified delivery date"); Jon Matonis, The Monetary Future, Hunt
Brothers Demanded Physical Delivery Too (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://themonetaryfuture.blogspot.com/2009/01/hunt-brothers-demanded-physical.html (The "Hunt
brothers silver saga of 1979-1980" provides a useful example of physical delivery: "Forty million oz of
silver was loaded onto the planes and they immediately flew to Zurich where they were met by another
convoy of armored trucks") (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, supra note 80. See also Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP, CFTC Seeks Comments on Trading Practices 3 (2010),
http://www.willkie.com/files/tbls29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C3624%5CCFTCSeeks-Co
mmentsOnTradingPractices.pdf ("[H]ow should the CFTC distinguish between orderly and
disorderly trading?"); Asjylyn Loder, Commodity Manipulation May Be Easier to Prove After
Overhaul, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 19, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http:/Ibx.businessweek.com/fmancial-
regulation/view?url=http%3A%2F%2Fnoir.bloomberg.com%2Fapps%2Fnews%3Fpid%3D20601068%
26sid%3DaA224KAZmQrM (comparing the standard for whether trading is orderly or disorderly to the
standard for pornography and stating that '[t]he CFTC is going to say, we know orderly when we see it.
And that's going to be a bone of contention').
82 See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, supra note 80.
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speculator to "corner the market in [that particular] commodity." 83 The
earliest position limits imposed under federal law were those on wheat and
other grains in 1938, followed by cotton and then soybeans in the 1940s.84
Position limits are determined based "the deliverable supply of the
underlying commodity and on the size of the corresponding futures and
options market." 85 Limits are generally divided into three categories, which
are spot month, single month, and all months combined. 86 Spot month
position limits set a maximum on the number of futures or options
contracts that an investor may hold in a contract month that "is entering or
has entered its delivery cycle." 87 The spot month position limit applies
once investors have notice the delivery cycle is being entered.88 The CFTC
83 Megan McArdle, Position Limits on Oil Trading: Why Not?, THE ATLANTIC (July 24, 2008,
1:25 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2008/07/position-limits-on-oil-trading-why-
not/3875/.
84 See Jim Overdahl, Federal Speculative Position
Limits, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, 4 (2004),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/aac07212004 comments.pdf. The
original version of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 "allowed the Commission to set the same or
different limits for different commodities, markets, and delivery months." Allen B. Paul, Speculative
Position Limits 124 (1980), available at
http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edulirwin/archive/papers/Research%20on%20Speculation9.pdf For
example, in the case of potatoes, "lower limits were set for contracts maturing late in the marketing
year," which presumably was tied potato harvesting season. Id Position limits, according to some
critics, made more sense prior to the Internet when market data was not available instantaneously. See
Position Limits Origin and Market Effects, BEFORE IT'S NEWS (Dec. 22, 2010 8:53 AM),
http://beforeitsnews.com/story/322/l17/Position Limits Origin andMarketEffects.html. At that time
it was easier for market participants to "corner" the market in order to drive prices higher, a practice
that was deemed detrimental to the market and consumers; position limits prevented this activity by
limiting the number of contracts that a speculator could hold and thereby "kept the players in the market
honest." Id
85 Seamon, supra note 79, at 5. In the case of the spot month position limits, which "may be no
greater than one-quarter of the estimated deliverable supply at the futures delivery points," the
application would be as follows:
[I]f the minimum monthly deliverable supply over an entire crop year at all corn futures delivery points
is 12 million bushels, one-quarter of this amount is 3 million bushels. Since each corn futures contract
represents 5,000 bushels, the corn spot month speculative limit would be 3 million divided by 5,000 or
600 contracts.
Id, at 5. While the earliest position limits were imposed by federal regulation, in 198 1, the government
required exchanges to set position limits for commodities that were not subject to federal position
limits. See Overdahl, supra note 84, at 4. The "size" of the market refers to the number of contracts,
which is demonstrated later in the discussion of how non-spot month limits are calculated using the
"open interest" which is a metric based on the number of contracts traded. See infra notes 119-21 and
accompanying text.
86 See Seamon, supra note 79, at 1-2; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Q & A- Position
Limits for Futures and Swaps, CFTC.GOV,
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/plqafinal.pdf (last visited Oct.
18, 2013).
87 Seamon, supra note 79, at 1. The delivery cycle is discussed in infra note 88. Also see supra
note 80 for a discussion of what happens when physical delivery takes place.
88 The following example demonstrates how this would operate in the context of com futures
contracts:
[S]ellers may give their intention to deliver against corn futures contracts two business days prior to the
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and exchanges also establish position limits for single (non-spot) months
and all months combined. 89
While market participants acknowledge the value of having position
limits in place, investors and industry groups have been extremely vocal in
their concerns regarding the imposition of position limits, particularly over
fears that position limits have the potential to decrease market liquidity and
increase transaction costs.90 Also, critics of position limits have more
recently suggested that over-aggressive use of position limits will simply
drive U.S. investors to foreign markets and counterparties that are outside
the reach of U.S. regulation.91 Those critics argue that incentivizing
investors to transact business with non-U.S. entities and on non-U.S.
exchanges decreases market transparency, limiting the amount of
regulatory oversight available and putting the markets at greater risk for
another decline.92
The overwhelmingly restated concern is that position limits decrease
liquidity and increase transaction costs and that those costs are passed
along to consumers (or in the case of this Note, small businesses seeking
financing). For example, ISDA, in a letter to the CFTC, noted that
"position limits can be a useful tool but that they can also restrict market
liquidity and impair the price discovery function of the markets utilized by
a broad range of market participants, particularly commercial hedgers." 93
delivery month. For the July 2008 Corn futures contract that recently went into delivery that date was
June 27, 2008. Thus, all speculators in the corn futures market could hold no more than 600 net long or
net short positions in the July 2008 Coin futures contract at the close of business on June 27th.
Seamon, supra note 79, at 1.
89 Id. at 2. A single month position limit sets the maximum number of "net long or net short
positions a speculator may hold in one non-spot contract." Id. In the case of an all months position limit,
using soybeans as an example, the speculator may hold no more than 10,000 contracts net long or short
(which includes futures and options) combined. Id. "The spot month is the nearest month in which
delivery can be made on a futures contract." Spot Month, REUTERS FINANCIAL GLOSSARY,
http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php/Spot Month (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). An example of this
would be if trading of a certain commodity contract is taking place in the end of October, then the spot
month would be November, since that would be the next month in which delivery could take place
(because the October contracts would already have expired). See Spot Delivery Month, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terns/s/spotmonth.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
90 See, e.g., infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Note that the term "market participant"
denotes a number of different groups including institutional and retail traders and investors, and also
industry regulators. "Transaction cost" refers to the cost of hedging, which would arguably increase if
limits reduced liquidity in the exchange traded markets. QUENEAU, supra note 79, at 2. This is similar
to the discussion in Section I of this Note, supra, which explains that by reducing the availability of
CDSs, it becomes more expensive to hedge loans or other debt positions; that expense in turn is passed
on to the borrower through less favorable terms.
91 See, e.g., infra note 94 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., id.
93 Letter from Robert Pickel, Exec. Vice Chairman, ISDA, & Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice
President, SIFMA, to David Stawick, Sec'y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (Jan. 11, 2011),
available at http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdflCFTC-Position-Limits-Pre-Comment.pdf. See also supra
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Even two of the CFTC's own commissioners have previously "expressed
concerns that [position limits] could drive business out of the United States
to [foreign exchanges], or to unregulated OTC markets, and thus might
impair the liquidity and price discovery functions of U.S. futures
markets."94 In the context of swap markets, "proposed restrictions on swap
dealers' use of exchange-traded markets to manage their risks may cause
swap dealers either to pass along their increased risks to their swaps
counterparties (e.g., airlines, pooled investment vehicles, pension plans) in
the form of higher pricing and more restrictive terms or to cease entering
into further swap transactions entirely once their futures limits are reached.
Either action could negatively impact market liquidity." 95
Some critics have also argued that trading without position limits would
provide the market with more accurate information in terms of the value of
the assets being bought and sold.96 The theory is that as prices change as a
result of trading activity (i.e., buying and selling which reflects demand),
end-users adjust their consumption accordingly 97; however, if trading is
artificially impaired through position limits, then there is insufficient
market activity to change the price to reflect the accurate demand in the
marketplace and thus end-users operate without knowing the true value of
note 10 and accompanying text (defining ISDA as the "International Swaps and Derivatives
Association"); Maureen O'Hara, Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery, J. FIN. (Aug.
2003) http://www.afajof.org/afa/all/presadd2003.pdf ("Price discovery involves the incorporation of
new information into asset prices . . . ."); Price Discovery Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pricediscovery.asp#axzzlijG6RcN3 ("[Price discovery is a]
method of determining the price for a specific commodity or security through basic supply and demand
factors related to the market. ... For example, if the demand for a particular commodity is higher than
its supply, the price will typically increase (and vice versa)."); Price Discovery, LONDON METAL
EXCHANGE, http://www.lme.com/price discovery.asp ("The most reliable prices in any market are
derived from those where the greatest concentration of trading takes place.").
94 Lawrence B. Patent & Charles R. Mills, CFTC Proposes Energy Related Position Limits, K&L
GATES LLP (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?publication=6182.
Regarding the term "price discovery":
[O]ne of the main goals of the futures markets is price discovery. The futures markets are responsible
for discovering the true price of commodities. With the use of open outcry to bid for contracts, the true
value of commodities is discovered in the pits of the nation's futures exchanges. A market that allows
one person to determine allocation cannot be engaged in legitimate price discovery because an
individual, not the market, is determining allocation;
V. Leelakumar Peesapati, Freedom of Markets or License to Loot: Proposed Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Regulation 1.35, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 97, 118-19 (1994) (internal citations
omitted).
95 Patent & Mills, supra note 94.
96 See McArdle, supra note 83 ("I'm opposed to a bill that does 'sensible' things like regulating
position limits .... They are aimed at hedge funds betting on the future price of oil. Those bets provide
the market with valuable information: a lot of people think that the price of oil is going to go up.").
97 See id. ("The effect of that information is to raise the future price, which makes current
consumers unhappy. But in fact, if the speculators are right, they're doing us a service by giving us a
basically gradual price rise that helps us conserve.").
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the asset. 98
This argument was originally made in the context of a significant rise in
oil prices which took place in 2007 and 2008,99 and most apparently
impacted consumers by raising the price of gasoline for their cars.100
Critics of position limits stated that the increase in gas prices would induce
consumers to adjust their consumption habits, which might be
demonstrated in different decisions such as reduced consumption or car
manufacturers designing cars to be more fuel efficient.101 Had that price
increase not taken place gradually and early on, if and when a real oil
shortage occurred, consumers would have taken no action to adjust their
consumption would be worse off, facing a sudden change rather than a
gradual one. 102
Interestingly, the same argument might apply to CDSs, particularly in
the context of "naked" CDSs, in which the protection buyer does not own
the reference obligation. 103 Some have argued that the trading of naked
98 See id. ("If [speculators] are on the money, and Congress chases them out of the market, we'll
suffer more later, wishing all the while that we hadn't used the stuff so profligately."). Note that this
viewpoint is in conflict with the assertion that excessive speculation creates artificially high or low
prices, which do not express the true value of the commodity. See supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
99 During the "oil shock" of 2007 and 2008, oil reached $145 per barrel in July 2008, followed by a
sudden and drastic price collapse. James D. Hamilton, Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of
2007-08, abstract, 1, available at
http://www.brookings.eduleconomics/bpea/-/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2009_springbpea_pape
rs/2009_spring bpea hamilton.pdf. See McArdle, supra note 83 and accompanying text. See also Brad
Plumer, Are Speculators to Blame for Soaring Gas Prices?, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/are-speculators-to-blame-for-our-gas-price-
woes/2012/03/05/glQAqMS8sR _blog.html (discussing oil speculation and noting that "many
economists argue that this type of speculation can serve a legitimate purpose. 'If there's a risk of a
supply disruption in the future, then we'd want to store a little more oil right now so that we had that
contingency for later .... If we were right to be worried, it will turn out to be a good thing."').
100 See How Gas Prices Work, How STUFF WORKS, http://auto.howstuffworks.com/fuel-
efficiency/fuel-consumption/gas-price.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) (discussing the relationship
between the prices of oil and gasoline, and the related effect on consumers). See also McArdle, supra
note 83 and accompanying text; Plumer, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
101 See McArdle, supra note 83 ("[Ilf the speculators are right, they're doing us a service by giving
us a basically gradual price rise that helps us conserve.. . . If they're wrong, later we'll have cheap gas
and more fuel efficient cars, hardly a tragedy.").
102 See id ("If [speculators] are on the money, and Congress chases them out of the market, we'll
suffer more later, wishing all the while that we hadn't used the stuff so profligately."). Restated, the
argument of these critics seems to be that consumption is dictated by market price; if market price
remained artificially low because of position limits and consumption remained unadjusted, then when a
price correction occurred to reflect scarcity of oil, consumption, expressed through gas consumption
and fuel-efficient cars, would have to rapidly correct, as opposed to a gradual change taking place as the
price of oil climbed steadily as a result of speculation. See also Plumer, supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
103 Sam Jones, The Benefits of Naked CDS, ALPHAVILLE (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/03/02/161556/the-benefits-of-naked-cds/ (defining naked CDSs as
those in which "CDS positions [are] taken by investors who do not own the underlying bond to which
the contract refers").
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CDSs can drive down the value of the reference obligation (i.e., a
company's debt, whether a loan or bond) because the CDS gives the
reference obligation the appearance of being less creditworthy. 104
However, there is also an argument to be made that the market's decision
to trade such that the value of this debt decreases, reflects the true
creditworthiness of the company, thereby providing potential lenders with
an opportunity to adjust their behavior vis-A-vis this company accordingly,
whether by lending on less favorable terms, taking more collateral, etc. 105
Regardless of arguments made for and against the use of position
limitS,106 market participants generally seem to agree that at least some
limit on the size of a position that may be held should be in place because
of the limit it places on excessive speculation.107 Thus, the issue becomes
not one of whether to have the limits at all, but rather what those limits
should be, keeping in mind the need to protect participants from excessive
speculation and balancing that need with the goal of not harming liquidity
104 See Charles Davi, Derivative Dribble, Naked CDS: Exposed (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2009/08/10/naked-cds-exposed/, which compares naked CDS
trading to trading unhedged put options, a practice which has met with no negative press despite its
similarity to the use of naked CDSs. Buying CDS protection expresses a "negative view on" the
creditworthiness of a borrower because the buyer anticipates that the borrower will not be able to repay
its obligation. Id. See also Anu Munshi, Structured Credit Investor, Banning Naked CDS Shorts: A
Bridge Too Far (Mar. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.bandbstructuredfinance.com/documents/BanningnakedCDSshortsabridgetoofarSCIMarch20
1 l.pdf (stating that "[w]e've read the widespread criticism of naked short selling via CDS and how it
can push corporates and sovereigns into default or a web of spiraling cost of debt. Widening CDS
spreads can cause cashflow problems for issuers by increasing their cost of financing.").
105 See generally John Hull et al., The Relationship Between Credit Default Swap Spreads, Bond
Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements 6-7 (2004),
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/-hull/DownloadablePublications/HPWPaperonCDSSpreads.pdf
(discussing the relationship between CDS spreads and bond ratings, and particularly relevant here, the
extent to which a change in the CDS spread of a bond precedes a similar change in its rating). See also
Munshi, supra note 104 (arguing that "[b]anning naked CDS shorts isn't a good move for a variety of
reasons. The CDS price of an issuer tells you about the market perception of its creditworthiness. ...
Barring naked CDS shorts will constrain a fully functioning two-way credit market and reduce the
reliability of an important market barometer.").
106 See Allen Sykora, Analysts: Position Limits Could Reduce Liquidity In U.S. Commodity
Futures Markets, Krrco NEws, (Jan. 26, 2011) http://community.nasdaq.com/News/201 1-01/analysts-
position-limits-could-reduce-liquidity-in-us-commodity-futures-markets.aspx?storyid=55534 (quoting
several industry analysts on their opinions regarding the imposition of position limits on the energy
markets by the federal govemment). See also Munshi, supra notes 104-05.
107 See, e.g., Yahoo! Answers, What is meant by "Market Wide Position Limit" in derivatives?,
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080825193742AAoFAsx (last visited Mar. 10, 2011)
(noting that position limits are important because they limit counterparty risk that a party on one side of
a trade will not be able to cover its losses and because they prevent derivatives trading from unduly
influencing the price of the underlying asset). Cf Michael W. Masters & Adam K. White, The
Accidental Hunt Brothers: How Institutional Investors Are Driving Up Food and Energy Prices (July
21, 2008), available at http://www.loe.org/images/content/080919/Actl.pdf (asserting that Congress
should impose more stringent position limits on commodities "[t]o repair the damage to the price
discovery \ function and to bring food and energy prices down to levels that more accurately reflect
supply and demand").
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or unnecessarily passing transaction costs along to end-users.108 The
following subsection examines a position limit scheme for commodity
derivatives that was recently proposed by the CFTC.
B. Recently Proposed Position Limits on Physical Commodities
Earlier this year, the CFTC "issued proposed rules ... that establish
position limits and limit formulas for twenty-eight physical commodityl 09
futures and option contracts and physical commodity swaps that are
economically equivalent to such contracts."110 These limits were proposed
pursuant to Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which "requires that the
CFTC establish position limits for certain physical commodity and related
cash-settled derivatives."I The setting and implementation of these limits
will be gradual and is predicted to culminate in the first quarter of 2012.112
Trying to mitigate some of the concerns described earlier in this Note, the
CFTC stated that "[t]he proposed position limits framework would enable
the Commission to meet its statutory responsibility for setting limits in
order to combat excessive speculation and manipulation while ensuring
sufficient market liquidity and efficient price discovery."' 1 3
The implementation process is divided into two phases, with the eventual
goal that the CFTC devise its own limits, separate from those previously
imposed by exchanges, and to impose those new limits on a spot, single
and all month basis.' 14 "The purpose for this two-step approach is to allow
the CFTC enough time to gather data on physical commodity swaps,"
108 See Pickel & Bentsen, supra note 93, at 5 ("We believe it is possible to create a position limit
regime that meets the statutory requirements of Dodd-Frank and also serves the needs of the
marketplace, but, as our comments indicate, much more work and research need to be done in order to
reach the appropriate balance .... [and] to devise sensible position limit proposals that preserve market
liquidity while ensuring that manipulation and excessive speculation are deterred.").
109 According to the CFTC, "28 specific [previously] exempt and agricultural commodities are
covered by the proposed regulations. [Previously] [e]xempt commodities broadly include, but are not
limited to, gold, silver, copper, platinum, palladium, crude oil, natural gas, heating oil, and gasoline.
Agricultural commodities broadly include, but are not limited to, com, oats, rice, soybeans, soybean
meal, soybean oil, wheat, feeder cattle, live cattle, lean hogs, milk, cocoa, coffee, orange juice, sugar,
and cotton." Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Office of Public Affairs, Q & A - Position
Limits for Derivatives 1 (2011),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/pl-qa.pdf
110 Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, CFTC Issues Proposed Regulations Regarding Position
Limits for Derivatives 1 (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub1041.PDF (citing
Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 Fed. Reg. 17 (Jan. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2011-1154a.pdf).
111 Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, supra note 110, at 2.
112 See id
113 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, supra note 109, at 1 (emphasis added).
114 See Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, supra note 110, at 2. For explanations of spot, single and
all-month bases, refer to supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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which it was previously unable to do "under the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000."115 Because spot month data is based on the
estimated deliverable supply, whereas data for the physical swap market
has not yet been collected, "the Commission can implement spot-month
limits relatively expeditiously in the initial transitional phase while waiting
to receive the necessary data to implement non-spot-month limits in the
second phase."I16
Presently, the CFTC has proposed separate formulas and methods of
calculating positions, depending on whether the limit is for a spot month.' "1
Spot month limits will be set at 25% of the estimated spot month
deliverable supply, with an exception for up to five times that amount as
long as the position does not exceed the single month limit and the trader's
position is solely in cash-settled contracts. 118 The non-spot month limits
will be calculated based on the open interestl1 9 of the particular contract,
with limits for each contract and class of contract. 120 Contracts of the same
class would be combined and netted together to determine the trader's
single and all month positions for that particular class.121
This Note's proposal for position limits on CDSs122 and that of the
CFTC for physical commodity derivatives are consistent on a number of
115 Id.
116 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, supra note 109, at 2.
117 See id. at 1.
118 See id. Note that physical settlement means that under the terms of the contract, whether a
future, forward, or option, the parties have a right or obligation to physically deliver or receive the
underlying commodity. See Physical Settlement, Cash Settlement,
http://www.riskglossary.com/link/physical%20settlement.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011). Contrast this
to a cash settlement, which would most likely include commodity swaps, in which the parties make
cash payments based on the value of the underlying commodity. See id. For an example of "deliverable
supply," refer to supra note 85 and accompanying text.
119 Open interest means "[t]he options or futures contracts that an investor has not closed and that
have not matured or expired. For example, if an investor buys 10 futures contracts on Monday, and sells
six on Wednesday, the investor has an open interest of four at the end of the trading day on Wednesday.
It should not be confused with the trading volume for an option or futures contract." THE FREE
DICTIONARY, Open Interest, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Open+Interest (last
visited Mar. 10, 2011). More simply stated, it is "[t]he number of contracts for particular futures or an
option which, at a given time, are outstanding." Id Contrast this with "trading volume," which is "[tihe
measure how many trades take place for a security or on an exchange on a given trading day." THE
FREE DICTIONARY, Trading Volume, http://fmancial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Trading+Volume
(last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
120 See Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, supra note I10, at 3. See also Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Q & A - Position Limits for Futures and Swaps 2,
http://www.cfic.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/plqa final.pdf (explaining that
"[o]pen interest used in determining non-spot-month position limits will be based on futures open
interest, cleared swaps open interest, and uncleared swaps open interest.").
121 See Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, supra note 110, at 4. See also Q & A - Position Limits
for Futures and Swaps, supra note 120, at 2 (stating that "[tihe non-spot-month position limits apply to
positions a trader may have in all contract months combined or in a single contract month.").
122 See generally infra conclusion.
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points. While this Note proposes a net notional-based calculation for
determining a trader's true position, the CFTC proposal nets together long
and short (i.e., buy and sell) positions of contracts. 123 Using number of
contracts as the unit of measurement in the case of physical commodities,
as opposed to net notional, makes sense because exchange-traded
commodity contracts have identical, uniform size, and even an OTC
derivative based on a physical commodity could likely be converted into an
equivalent number of contracts for the purpose of determining the size of
the position.124 While not completely analogous, the change in limits based
on the month and the deliverable supply of the underlying commodity
shows a degree of flexibility of the limits, which is also suggested in this
proposal.125 Finally both frameworks identify the need for additional work
done in this area, particularly the need for further research regarding
liquidity concerns as a result of position limits.126
C. Proposed Position Limit Scheme for CDSs
This Note presents a rough framework for position limits on CDSs that
facilitate widespread use, emphasizing mindfulness of maintaining liquidity
in the CDS and related debt markets, while providing an adequate
safeguard against multilateral default in the event of another credit crisis. 127
The crux of this proposal is to limit positions of CDSs for a particular
reference obligation based on net notional (as opposed to net number of
contracts), as CDSs are not traded in uniform contract sizes, making them
quite distinct from exchange-traded futures and options contracts. 128 As
discussed, the traditional implementation of position limits in the
commodity markets has been as a maximum number of options or futures
123 Compare supra note 121 and accompanying text with infra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text.
124 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
125 Compare supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text with infra notes 135-38 and
accompanying text.
126 See infra notes 139 and accompanying text.
127 See generally Pickel & Bentsen, supra note 93, at 5. See also CME GROUP, Excessive
Speculation and Position Limits in Energy Derivatives Markets 7 (2009),
http://www.cmegroup.com/company/files/PositionLimitsWhitePaper.pdf
128 See generally Difference Between OTC and ET Derivatives, CONTRARIAN INVESTORS'
JOURNAL, (May 1, 2008), http://cij.inspiriting.com/?p=433 (discussing the difference between OTC and
exchange-traded products, and noting that while exchange-traded contracts are standardized, OTC
contracts are privately negotiated between the parties and are "tailor-made to the two parties' liking").
See also Credit Default Swap (CDS) Primer 3 (May 12, 2004),
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/content/NomuraCDSPrimer 12May04.pdf (noting that "[tlhere are
no limits on the size or maturity of CDS contracts. However, most contracts fall between $10 million to
$20 million in notional amount.").
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contracts that a trader could hold at a given time. 129 This Note proposes
that position limits on CDSs should be implemented based on a maximum
net notional, either for a specific reference obligation, or for similar types
of reference obligations, which would share similar characteristics and thus
have approximately equivalent credit risk for the parties involved. It might
also be possible to create a scheme of position limits which combines
aspects from both of those calculation methods.
What does it mean to calculate a position based on net notional? Assume
that a bank executes a CDS in which it sells protection on a particular
reference obligation. The notional of the first CDS was $100 million. That
same bank then executes a CDS in which it buys protection on that same
reference obligation and the notional of the second CDS is $90 million.
Assuming all other factors are equal, such as tenor, fixed interest rate, etc.,
the bank has a net CDS position for that particular reference obligation of
$10 million. The protection buy and sell go in opposite directions. The sell
is $100 million and the buy is $90 million; when those two amounts are
netted together, because they have opposite signage, the net amount is $10
million, specifically a net sell of $10 million. 130
The advantage of this method of calculating the position limit is that it
does not penalize the bank for doing a large volume of business 31; rather,
because the bank knows ahead of time what its position limits are, there is
an incentive for the bank to adequately hedge its positions (i.e., execute
trades that reduce its net position). The bank is still able to make a market
in CDSs for a given reference obligation, which across a large number of
buyers and sellers equates to liquidity in the CDS market as a whole, and
by encouraging the bank to hedge its CDS position, there can presumably
be spill-over liquidity into other markets, if non-CDSs are used to hedge
and offset the position. 132 Thus, in the previous example, the bank could
129 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
130 See generally International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Top 10 CDS Positions,
CDS MARKETPLACE (Mar. 5, 2011),
http://www.isdacdsmarketplace.com/exposures and activity/top_10_cds osition.
131 If position limits were calculated on a gross notional or number-of-contracts basis, using the
example in the text, the bank would have a gross CDS position of $190 million, as opposed to true net
exposure of $10 million. See id. Net notional gives a clearer picture of what the bank's exposure to
credit risk for the reference obligation, whereas gross notional ignores the directionality of having either
bought or sold protection. See Eric J. Peterman et al., supra note 70 (observing that "[i]t would seem
rather odd to aggregate on a gross basis-and subsequently set position limits-because market
participants may, for example, carry CDS merely to hedge reference obligations they hold.").
132 See Sykora, supra note 106 (quoting futures trading strategist Charles Nedoss as saying, "To
me, the more players who are in the market, the more liquidity in the market."). The bank would likely
be encouraged to hedge its CDS positions with other securities because doing so would permit it to buy
or sell additional CDS contracts, since the better hedged a position, the less impact it has on making the
bank reach its position limit. Furthermore, if active trading and large numbers of buyers and sellers
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hedge the first $100 million notional CDS by taking a short position a
certain number of bonds issued by the reference entity. While a credit event
might trigger the bank's obligation to pay under the terms of CDS, the
money made in the short position when the bond price decreased would at
least partially offset the payment to be made under the CDS contract.
Alternatively, the bank could hedge its position by purchasing an option to
enter into an offsetting CDS referencing the same obligation. Either of
these scenarios, multiplied across several CDS market participants, would
increase liquidity in related debt and/or option markets, benefitting not only
the business whose borrowing activity is facilitated by the availability of
CDSs, but market participants universally, at least across related asset
classes.133
equate to liquidity, then banks going into other markets to hedge their CDS positions would equate to
"spill-over liquidity" in those related markets.
133 There are likely two main concerns about implementing this position limit scheme: operational
difficulty, which might include record keeping and other procedural requirements (e.g., real-time
systems to ensure that a bank or other CDS user does not exceed its position limit); and the increased
transparency requirements, as there would need to be greater disclosure in order to effectively utilize a
dynamic position limit scheme that could be readily adjusted based on different criteria. New
regulations, such as those regarding position limits, "establish[] record-keeping and reporting
requirements for swap dealers and major swap participants, and . . . prescribe which records must be
maintained by swap dealers and major swap participants." Johnny Lee, Dodd-Frank Act Creates New
Record-Keeping Requirements for Commodities Traders, FORENSIC UPDATE (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://forensicupdate.wordpress.com/2011/02/08/dodd-frank/. These "new rules regarding the
derivatives market, [mean that] many companies are unsure how much the regulatory overhaul will end
up costing them." Cost of Dodd-Frank Compliance Remains Shadowy, FINCAD (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://derivative-news.fincad.com/derivatives-regulations/cost-of-dodd-frank-compliance-remains-
shadowy-994/. Even companies other than financial services firms, such as "[t]ransportation companies
and food producers - which use derivative contracts for hedging purposes - will also be affected by the
legislation." Id. Generally speaking, "[c]ompanies subject to the [Dodd Frank] Act, would be required
under the proposed .. . rules to maintain full and complete transaction and position information for all
swap activities." Lee, supra. Similar to observations made regarding accounting reform under Sarbanes-
Oxley, while possibly painful in the short-term, both in terms of cost and implementation, "if there's an
improvement in confidence by the market, improvement of the veracity of financial info, etc., then any
costs will be worth it." Jill M. D'Aquila, Tallying the Cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Nov. 2004),
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1104/perspectives/p6.htm (emphasis added) (internal
quotations omitted). Simply stated, it is an upfront cost now that is necessary to reduce the possibility of
a (far more costly) financial catastrophe in the future. Regarding the need for increased transparency,
there may be some backlash as "Wall Street firms' tend[] to hoard information about markets and how
they make money." Bradley Keoun, Trading Eludes Dodd-Frank as Investors See Black Box,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 12, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-12/trading-eludes-dodd-frank-
as-no-investors-see-inside-black-box.html. Critics of this "black box" mentality point out that "[i]f
there's one thing we've learned from the financial crisis, it's that a lack of transparency is absolutely
devastating . . . . [and that] [o]pacity also . . . contributed to a loss of confidence in the banks." Id.
(internal quotations omitted). However, financial services firms seem to have recognized, on their own,
the need for increased transparency in light of the latest financial crisis. "Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit
... said that 'markets cannot function without transparency' and that improved disclosure . . . would
help 'revive and sustain confidence in our financial system."' Id. "Tanya Azarchs, former head of North
American bank research at Standard & Poor's" recently noted that "' [t]he health of the banking system
impinges on all areas of the economy . . . . [slo their disclosure has to be top-notch."' Id. Towards that
end, "a group of 17 banks have come together to create a clearinghouse system to move credit default
swap[s] and cover a failure by one of the market-makers." David Enke, Central CDS Clearinghouse
(June 12, 2008), http://seekingalpha.com/article/80984-central-cds-clearinghouse. A clearinghouse is
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Finally, aided by the other regulatory innovations under Dodd-Frank,134
regulators should strive to make the actual size of the limits as dynamic as
possible, such that the CDS and debt markets are not harmed by illiquidity.
The means to ensure continued availability of financing for small
businesses is in the increased market transparency facilitated under this
statute. 135 Regulators should determine specific limits based on the credit
risk component of the reference obligation, perhaps using ratings provided
by credit rating agencies' 36 as a metric. Additionally, regulators must be
cognizant of the fluid nature of CDS market participants' financial health,
perhaps using net capitall 37 as a measure of a party's ability to incur credit
"[a]n agency or separate corporation," which is generally part of an exchange, that is "responsible for
settling trading accounts, clearing trades, collecting and maintaining margin monies, regulating delivery
and reporting trading data. Clearing houses act as third parties to all futures and options contracts - as a
buyer to every clearing member seller and a seller to every clearing member buyer." Clearing House,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clearinghouse.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2011);
see also What's a Clearinghouse?, THE EcONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/04/derivatives; International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, Inc., How Do Cleared Derivatives Differ From OTC Derivatives?,
http://www.isda.orgleducat/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). "ICE Trust LLC" is currently "the
largest U.S. clearinghouse for credit default swaps." Silla Brush, Wall Street's 'Derivatives Dealers
Club' May Break Up (Feb. 7, 2011),
http://thejavelin.com/index.php?option-com-content&view-article&id=149:bn-wall-streets-
derivatives-dealers-club-may-break-up-&catid=1:latest-news. Two significant "benefits of the
clearinghouse will be increased liquidity and transparency." Id. "Currently, it is difficult for companies
to even know what their credit risk exposure is given that the CDS market is thin and delayed, not to
mention opaque at best. The new [clearinghouse] system is a good step towards helping to shine light
on the CDS market by reducing credit risk, and allowing for more real-time price discovery." Id. Thus,
while secrecy regarding trading activity may have traditionally been the status quo on Wall Street, it
seems that both regulators and CDS market participants are taking serious steps to increase market
transparency, which means the response to report requirements under this proposed position limit
scheme are likely to be less negative than one might expect.
134 Dodd-Frank creates vastly increased oversight in the residential lending market to prevent
widespread predatory lending practices, which is essential for the survival of the secondary loan market,
which in turn goes hand-in-hand with the securitization industry. See generally §§ 1400-1498, 124 Stat.
at 2136-2212. Increased transparency for dealers and traders of CDSs is certainly essential: the situation
should not arise whereby regulators are struggling to determine a party's CDS exposure. Dodd-Frank,
through the advent of reporting and documentation requirements, as well as the establishment of swap
exchanges on which previously OTC-traded derivatives will now clear, implements an overall strategy
that will enhance the clarity and disclosure with which this market operates. See e.g., § 729, 124 Stat. at
1701-02; see also §§ 723, 733-34, 124 Stat. at 1675-82, 1712-18. Additionally, Dodd-Frank implements
new requirements for adequate capitalization, margin and collateral, and the use and regular review of
risk models, as part of the daily operations of the newly created derivatives exchanges. See e.g., §§ 725,
731, 736, 763, 124 Stat. at 1688, 1705, 1722, 1775-78.
135 See id.
136 See Jonathan Katz, et al., Credit Rating Agencies: No Easy Regulatory Solutions, Crisis
Response (Oct. 2009), available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/CrisisResponse/Note8.pdf ("A
credit rating is an opinion on the creditworthiness of a debt issue or issuer."); see also Denise Finney, A
Brief History of Ratings Agencies, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/09/history-credit-rating-
agencies.asp#axzzlisYMFj8I.
137 Net Capital, http://www.investorwords.com/3238/net capital.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011),
which defines "net capital" as "[a] firm's net worth, minus deductions taken for any assets that might
not easily be converted into cash at their full value." The greater the trader's net capital, presumably
the greater the ability of that trader to repay its obligations under CDS contracts and, thus, the greater
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risk through trading CDS contracts. A combination of these and other
quantitative and qualitative factors should be included in the calculus to
determine how much credit exposure a buyer or seller may safely incur at a
given time, balancing the need to maintain liquidity with the objective of
reducing incidents of counterparty default in CDS transactions. 138
Whatever limits regulators devise, those limits should be rolled out
gradually, similar to the enactment period discussed in the most recent
CFTC proposed rule on position limits for physical commodities. Gradual
implementation diminishes the likelihood that reactionary trading would
take place, as traders attempted to reduce their positions to meet regulatory
requirements. 139
Perhaps most critical, is the need for frequent and honest dialogue and
disclosure between regulators and market participants, which promotes the
widespread dissemination of information, thereby maintaining liquidity
his or her ability to incur credit risk. This is similar to Rule 15c3-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (i.e., the "Net Capital Rule"), which "requires broker-dealers to maintain 'net capital' (net worth
adjusted by certain deductions for illiquid assets and reserves against possible market losses on
securities positions) such that the liabilities incurred by the broker-dealer (its 'aggregate indebtedness')
does not exceed a certain percentage of the broker-dealer's net capital or of a specified percentage of
the aggregate of transactional moneys owed to the broker-dealer by customers (its 'aggregate debit
items')." Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Net Capital Rule,
http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/glossary/view-def.asp?param=NETCAPITALRULE (last visited Mar. 10,
2011). Under this rule, "[b]roker-dealers are required to suspend or terminate their securities activities if
they are unable to meet this test." Id.
138 Providing separate sets of limits for spot and non-spot months is not relevant to CDSs as there
is no uniform rule requiring physical delivery or receipt of the reference obligation imbedded in the
terms of the contract. See Michiko Whetten, et al., Credit Default Swap (CDS) Primer 4 (May 12,
2004), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/content/NomuraCDSPrimerl2MayO4.pdf
("The first step taken after a credit event occurs is a delivery of a 'Credit Event Notice,' either by the
protection buyer or the seller. Then the compensation is to be paid by the protection seller to the buyer
via either (1) physical settlement, or (2) cash settlement, as specified in the contract."); see also Mary
Brown, Credit Default Swaps: What Happens In A Credit Event?,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/09/what-happens-to-single-name-cds.asp#axzzl isYMFj8l
(last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (noting that the parties to the CDS can choose between either cash or
physical settlement).
139 See Sykora, supra note 106 ("As an example of what happens when rules push some out of
positions, [Spencer Patton] cites the steep one-day sell-off that occurred in silver futures in 2010 when
CME Group raised margin requirements."). Additionally, and also similar to the recent CFTC proposal,
regulators should schedule a period of research and information gathering, during which time resources
are dedicated towards analyzing potential effects of decreased liquidity in the CDS markets. See
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, supra note 110, at 2 ("The purpose for this two-step approach is to
allow the CFTC enough time to gather data on physical commodity swaps."). Because of the
relationship and possible impact on the U.S. lending economy, careful attention should be paid to the
relationship between CDS liquidity and financing cost and availability. Businesses that are sensitive to
changes in financing availability, particularly small businesses, could be harmed if a decrease in CDS
liquidity negatively impacted their ability to borrow. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. While
this Note sought to provide a series of analyses to demonstrate the existence of such a relationship, and
thus the importance of maintaining CDS liquidity, there appears to have been no empirical studies done
which link CDS liquidity specifically with small business lending. See generally supra Section l.
Further study in this area, as part of this proposed position limit scheme, would help mitigate any
possible future harm to small businesses.
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through rapid and dynamic changes in position limits as market conditions
dictate.
CONCLUSION
CDSs permit lenders to exchange what might otherwise be prohibitive
credit risk, 140 increasing the likelihood that they will lend,141 which in turn
increases the availability of financing for businesses,142 and thus, the
chance that those businesses will be able to remain solvent over longer
periods of time.143 Liquidity in the CDS markets facilitates lending, in turn,
by increasing liquidity in the debt markets.144 Businesses, particularly
small and newer businesses, require financing to continue operations due to
uncertain or inadequate cash flows.145 The relationship between the
continued success of these businesses and liquidity in the CDS markets
seems clear: CDSs permit otherwise risk averse lenders to reduce credit
risk and thus lend more favorably, 146 and the existence of sufficient debt
financing equates to continued and healthy operations of the businesses in
question.147
The need to guard against excessive speculation generally and in the
CDS market is widely recognized. 148 Thus, it seems inevitable that position
limits on CDSs will be imposed in the near future. The key is to devise a
position limit scheme that is not overly restrictive and ensures continued
liquidity in the CDS markets.149 That liquidity spills over into the lending
markets, which in turn means more lending to more businesses.150 The
proposed position limit scheme in this Note utilize net notional-based
position calculations and aggregation of CDSs and related hedges, to
ascertain the most accurate view of a market participant's position at a
given time.151 By ensuring that limits are dynamic, such that they can be
readily adjusted depending on market conditions, and by continuing
140 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
142 See id.
143 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
144 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
145 See supra note 1 Iand accompanying text.
146 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note II and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
149 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
151 See generally supra Part IV.
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research and active dialogue between regulators and market participants,' 52
it is likely that the CDS markets will continue to operate as usual and
commercial lending will be similarly unimpaired.153
CDSs play a critical role in today's credit economy.154 The ability to
obtain financing drives business and innovation to new levels; the CDS
protects the lender that supports those businesses, and in doing so, plays a
vital role in protecting the economy as a whole.
152 See id.
153 See supra notes 36-37, 113 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 41-42 and accompanying text.
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